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LC, a Utah Limited Liability Company, (hereinafter "Wintergreen"), by and through its
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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
§78-2-2(3)0)(2002)(appeal from final judgment).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE I:
Did the trial court err by dismissing Wintergreen's complaint, since Wintergreen
properly alleged all the elements of inverse condemnation claims under the state and federal
constitutions? (Issue Preserved: R. 92-93, 88)
Standard of Appellate Review: "When reviewing a dismissal based on rule
12[(b)(6)], an appellate court must accept the material allegations of the complaint as true
... and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly appears that [Plaintiff] can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.« 795 P.2d 622,
624 (Utah 1990).
ISSUE II:
Did the trial court err by dismissing Wintergreenfs Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Claims for
Relief for inverse condemnation under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution on the
ground that UDOT's initiation of direct condemnation proceedings under state statute against
parts of Wintergreen's land precluded Wintergreen's state constitutional inverse
condemnation claims with respect to all of Wintergreen's land detrimentally affected by
UDOPs conduct? (Issue Preserved: R. 88-92)
Standard of Appellate Review: In reviewing a trial court's grant of a defendant's
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12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, an appellate court accepts
the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interprets those facts and all inferences
drawn from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff Such dismissal is a question of
law that is reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's ruling. Oakwood
Village LLC v. Albertsons. Inc.. 2004 UT 101, ^99 104 P.3d 1226.
ISSUE HI:
Did the trial court err by dismissing Wintergreenfs First, Second and Third Claims for
Relief for inverse condemnation under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution on the ground that UDOTs initiation of direct
condemnation proceedings under state statute against parts of Wintergreen's land precluded
Wintergreen's federal constitutional inverse condemnation claims with respect to all of
Wintergreen's land detrimentally affected by UDOTs conduct? (Issue Preserved: R. 88-92)
Standard of Appellate Review: In reviewing a trial court's grant of a defendant's
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, an appellate court accepts
the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interprets those facts and all inferences
drawn from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Such dismissal is a question of
law that is reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's ruling. Oakwood
Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc.. 2004 UT 101, %9, 104 P.3d 1226.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL
amend. V.
[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

UNITED STATES CONST,
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UTAH CONST, art. I, §22.

Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation.
§ 78-34-10. Compensation and damages — How assessed.
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered by any of
the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
(1) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements thereon
appertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate estate or interest therein; and
if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of each estate or interest
therein shall be separately assessed;
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel,
the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason
of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff;
(3) if the property, though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by the
construction of the proposed improvement, the amount of such damages;
(4) separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and each estate or
interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the construction of the improvement
proposed by the plaintiff. If the benefit shall be equal to the damages assessed under
Subdivision (2) of this section, the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no
compensation except the value of the portion taken; but if the benefit shall be less
than the damages so assessed, the former shall be deducted from the latter, and the
remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition to the value of the portion
taken;
(5) if the property sought to be condemned consists of water rights or part of a water
delivery system or both, and the taking will cause present or future damage to or
impairment of the water delivery system not being taken, including impairment of the
systemsfs carrying capacity, an amount to compensate for the damage or impairment;
(6) if land on which crops are growing at the time of service of summons is sought to
be condemned, the value that those crops would have had after being harvested,
taking into account the expenses that would have been incurred cultivating and
harvesting the crops; and
(7) As far as practicable compensation must be assessed for each source of damages
separately.
UTAH CODE

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, disposition in the court below
This case presents the question whether the Utah legislature, by enacting a statute,
may prohibit a property owner from enforcing individual state and federal constitutional
rights in a Utah state court. It is elementary that statutes cannot trump constitutional rights,
and yet the trial court below erroneously so held.
Wintergreen owned approximately 121 acres of land in Tooele consisting of several
parcels of land on both sides of State Road 36. Wintergreen had assembled the land in order
to build the North Town Shopping Center. UDOT embarked on a project to widen SR-36 and
brought three separate direct condemnation lawsuits to acquire parts of Wintergreen's land
on each side of SR-36. UDOT obtained orders of immediate occupancy in each of the three
direct condemnation lawsuits and the reconstruction of SR-36 has proceeded.
As part of the reconstruction project, and in addition to filing the three direct
condemnation lawsuits, UDOT also permanently blocked off a street serving Wintergreen's
land; transformed another street into a right-in, right-out-only turnoff; and erected barriers
to prevent traffic from crossing from Wintergreen's land on one side of SR-36 to
Wintergreen's land on the other side of SR-36.
Each of the three direct condemnation lawsuits brought by UDOT treated different
individual segments of Wintergreen's total landholding as the relevant "larger parcel." Even
as so limited, UDOT refused to provide Wintergreen statutory severance damages in the three
direct condemnation lawsuits. Moreover, UDOT also refused to compensate Wintergreen for
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harm to Wintergreen's total 121-acre landholding resulting from the fragmentation of that
land caused by the direct condemnations. UDOT also refused to compensate Wintergreen
for the harm to Wintergreen's assembled land resulting from UDOT's physical actions
blocking off and obstructing streets to Wintergreen's land.
Wintergreen therefore filed a fourth, inverse condemnation, lawsuit in order (1) to
expand the inquiry to properly focus on the harm resulting from UDOT's direct
condemnation and physical conduct to Wintergreen's land as an integrated economic unit;
and (2) to assert state and federal constitutional claims in light of that broader focus.
The trial court below granted UDOT's motion to dismiss Wintergreen's inverse
condemnation lawsuit in its entirety on the ground that the statutory direct condemnation
proceedings brought by UDOT prohibited Wintergreen from asserting state and federal
constitutional claims, either in a separate lawsuit or as counterclaims in a consolidated action.
Statement of Facts
1. Plaintiff-Appellant Wintergreen Group, LC is a Utah limited liability company
doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. ("Wintergreen"). (R. 23 f3)
2. Defendant State of Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") is the Utah state
entity with general responsibility for the state's highway system. (R. 23 ^[4)
3. Sometime before 2004, UDOT embarked on a project to widen State Road SR-36
in the City of Tooele and to conduct ancillary construction and improvements ("UDOT SR36 Project"). (R. 23 f6)
4. Wintergreen owned several parcels of land in the City of Tooele, located on the
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east and west sides of State Road 36 (SR-36), between 2000 North and 2400 North Streets
("Wintergreen's land"). (R. 23 1J5)
5. Wintergreen's land is depicted on a portion of the Tooele Master Transportation
Plan Map attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 1. (R. 81)
6. Wintergreen's land consisted of a total of about 121.116 acres. (R. 23 f5)
7. Prior to the UDOT SR-36 Project, Wintergreen intended to use all its land, both
on the east and west sides of SR-36, for construction of the North Town Shopping Center as
an integrated economic unit. (R. 22-23 f7)
8. On March 30, 2004, UDOT served Wintergreen with summons and a complaint
for condemnation in Case Number 040300459 ("Case 459 direct condemnation"), in which
UDOT sought to condemn fee title to a strip of land of .275 acres belonging to Wintergreen
located on the east side of SR-36 along 2400 North Street. (R. 22 f 8)
9. On April 15,2004, UDOT served Wintergreen with summons and a complaint for
condemnation in Case Number 040300524 ("Case 524 direct condemnation"), in which
UDOT sought to condemn several parts of a 16.666-acre parcel of land owned by
Wintergreen located on the east side of SR-36, bordered by 2000 North on the south, 400
East on the east, and 2200 North on the north. The Case 524 direct condemnation sought to
condemn fee title to two parcels of the land together comprising 2.183 acres, one perpetual
easement of .111 acres, and three temporary easements amounting to .022 acres. (R. 22 f))
10. Also on April 15, 2004, UDOT served Wintergreen with summons and a
complaint for condemnation in Case Number 040300525 ("Case 525 direct condemnation"),
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in which UDOT sought to condemn fee title to a strip of land of 2.147 acres belonging to
Wintergreen located on the west side of SR-36 along the boundaries of four adjacent parcels
of land owned by Wintergreen which collectively amounted to 104.175 acres. (R. 21-22 ^flO)
11. On July 1,2004, the trial court entered an Order of Immediate Occupancy in each
of the Case 459, Case 524 and Case 525 direct condemnation lawsuits. (R. 21 ^[11)
12. As a proximate result of the UDOT SR-36 Project, Wintergreen's land now
consists of one 14.483-acre parcel on the east side of SR-36 burdened by a perpetual
easement and three temporary easements, and four adjacent parcels along the west side of
SR-36 consisting of 102.028 acres (116.511 acres hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Wintergreen's remaining land"). (R. 211fl2)
13. Wintergreen's remaining land has been reduced in total size to 116.511 acres,
subject to a perpetual easement and three temporary easements. (R. 21 Tfl3)
14. UDOT also took the physical action of permanently blocking off from all traffic
a formerly open tumoff from SR-36 onto 2000 North Street, which borders the southern
boundary of Wintergreen's remaining land located on the east side of SR-36. (R. 21 ^[14)
15. UDOT further took the physical action of rendering 2200 North into a right-in,
right-out-only street from SR-36, even though 2200 North is designated on the Tooele Master
Transportation Plan as an ordinary street connecting Wintergreen's land on each side of SR36. (R. 211f 15)
16. UDOT additionally took the physical action of closing off 2200 North westbound
from SR-36 toward the Overtake Subdivision located immediately west of Wintergreen's
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remaining land, even though 2200 North is designated on the Tooele Master Transportation
Plan as an ordinary street traversing Wintergreen's land toward the Overtake Subdivision. (R.
20fl7)
17. As a proximate result of UDOT's condemnation of part of Wintergreen's land;
UDOT's physically permanently blocking off from all traffic a formerly open tumoff from
SR-36 onto 2000 North Street; UDOT's physically rendering of 2200 North Street into a
right-in, right-out-only street from SR-36; and UDOT's physically closing off of 2200 North
westbound from SR-36 toward the Overlake Subdivision, all the parcels of Wintergreen's
remaining land have been isolated from each other, Wintergreen has been prevented from
developing its land into the North Town Shopping Center as an integrated economic unit, and
Wintergreen's remaining land has been substantially reduced in value. (R. 20 f 18)
18. In the three direct condemnation lawsuits, UDOT offered Wintergreen no
statutory severance damages and nothing for the resulting harm to Wintergreen's land as a
whole integrated economic unit. (R. 20 ^[20; R. 154)
19. On March 18, 2005, Wintergreen therefore filed an "Inverse Condemnation"
lawsuit, seeking relief under the Just Compensation Clauses of the Utah and Federal
Constitutions, in order (1) to expand the inquiry to properly focus on the harm to
Wintergreen's land as a whole integrated economic unit resulting from UDOT's physical and
condemnation conduct; and (2) to assert state and federal constitutional claims in light of
that broader focus. (R. 1-24)
20. On March 6,2006, the trial court enteredfinaljudgment granting UDOT's motion
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to dismiss Wintergreen's "Inverse Condemnation" lawsuit in its entirety for failure to state
a claim, on the sole ground that UDOT's three statutory direct condemnation lawsuits
precluded the filing of Wintergreen's inverse condemnation lawsuit asserting claims under
the constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States. (R. 169-77 at 172)
21. On March 31,2006, Wintergreen filed its Notice of Appeal to this Court. (R. 183)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Wintergreen's complaint alleged inverse condemnation claims under the Utah and
Federal Constitutions. The trial court erroneously dismissed Wintergreen's complaint on the
ground that such claims are precluded by statutory direct condemnation proceedings brought
byUDOT.
Wintergreen contends its complaint stated claims for relief under this court's existing
interpretations of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. However, Wintergreen also
suggests that such jurisprudence should be revised to more closely follow the Framers1 intent.
Wintergreen's complaint also states claims for relief under such revised jurisprudence.
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ARGUMENT
I. Wintergreen's Complaint Properly Alleges Both State and Federal Constitutional
Inverse Condemnation Claims Sufficient to Overcome UDOTs Motion to Dismiss
A. Standard of Judicial Review on a Motion to Dismiss Favors Wintergreen
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "is to challenge the formal
sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the merits of a case."
Whipple v. AmericanForkImgationCo..910P.2d 1218.1220 (Utah 1996). Thus. Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires only that a complaint contain a "short and plain statement
... showing that the pleader is entitled to relief1 and "a demand for judgment for the relief.
All reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 841 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah Ct.App.1992). "A
dismissal is a severe measure and should be granted by the trial court only if it is clear that
a party is not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of
its claim." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).
B. Wintergreen1 s Complaint Properly Alleges State and Federal Constitutional
Claims
1. Wintergreen's Complaint Properly Alleges State Constitutional Claims
a. Nature and Elements of State Inverse Condemnation Claims
The Just Compensation Clause of the Utah Constitution provides: "Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." UTAH CONST, art. I,
Sec. 22. That Clause protects "private property" from governmental "taking" or "damaging"
for "public use" without payment of just compensation. Farmers New World Life Insurance
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Co. v. Bountiful City. 803 P.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Utah 1990); see generally 3 Sands, Libonati
& Martinez, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, §§ 16.53.10-16.53.50; Martinez & Libonati, STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW,

A Transactional Approach 312-39 (2000).

Three different scenarios give rise to Just Compensation claims under Article I,
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution: (1) "Direct condemnation" occurs, for example, when
a private home that lies in the path of a proposed freeway is purchased "directly" by UDOT.
In that scenario, there is no question that (A) "private property" (the home), (B) a "taking"
(expropriation of the home), and (C) a "public use" (freeway), are all present. UDOT
unquestionably is required to initiate a direct condemnation proceeding and pay fair market
value to the owner in that setting. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-34-1-78-34-20.
(2) "Inverse condemnation" occurs when private property is taken or damaged for
public use and either (A) the government has not initiated direct condemnation proceedings
at all, or (B) as in this case, the property owner asserts that the direct condemnation
proceedings which the government has brought will not provide the constitutionally required
"just compensation" to the owner. Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. v. Bountiful City,
803 P.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Utah 1990); see also 3 Sands, Libonati & Martinez, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW,

§ 21:14 (de facto takings); § 21:16 (precondemnation blight).

Inverse condemnation law in Utah has followed a particularly tortuous path. This
court initially held that the state Just Compensation Clause was self-executing, and did not
require legislative grace to implement it. Webber v. Salt Lake City. 40 Utah 221,224,120
P. 503, 504 (1911). The court later reversed itself, however, holding instead that no claim
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could be brought directly under the state constitution absent implementing legislation.
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960). Then in 1990, the
court reversed itself again, joining the vast majority of state courts in holding that such a
claim can be brought. Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622,630-34 (Utah 1990).
Constant resort to first principles therefore is indispensable to keeping one's bearings
in the field. The foundational principle of inverse condemnation law is that "The tendency
under our system is too often to sacrifice the individual to the community." Stockdale v. Rio
Grande Western Rv. Co.. 28 Utah 201, 203, 77 P. 849, 852 (1904). Like the analogous
provision in the federal constitution's Fifth Amendment, the Utah Just Compensation Clause
"was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." U.S. CONST.
AMEND.

V; Armstrong v. United States. 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).

In determining whether Wintergreen's complaint properly alleges inverse
condemnation claims under the Utah constitution, therefore, both principles of civil
procedure as well as the substantive policies underlying inverse condemnation theory counsel
that Wintergreen's complaint should be upheld against UDOT's motion to dismiss.
b. Wintergreen Properly Alleged Each Element of State Inverse
Condemnation Claims
Wintergreen properly alleged two "taking" claims (Claims 4 and 5) and a "damaging"
claim (Claim 6) under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution as presently construed.
(1) "Private Property"
Wintergreen alleged that it owns "private property" in the form of fee title ownership
12

to approximately 121.116 acres of land in Tooele. (R. 23 ^|5); Farmers New World Life Ins.
Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241,1244 (Utah ^(^("'property' includes but is not limited
to land'1); Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990)("some
protectible interest"; lease).
(2) "Public Use"
UDOT's reconstruction of SR-36 was for a "public use," because it was undertaken
to "promote the public interest, and ... tends to develop the great natural resources of the
[state]." (R. 17 | 4 1 ; R. 16 f!5; R. 15 1J52); Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371, 373
(1904)(irrigation ditches); see also Highland Bov Gold Min. Co. v. Stricklev. 28 Utah 215,
78 P. 296 (1904)(roads and tramways for mining industry).
(3) "Taking"
A ''taking" under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution as presently construed
is "any substantial interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens its
value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree
abridged or destroyed." Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d at 626 (citations
omitted). Wintergreen alleged "UDOT's conduct substantially interfered with and destroyed
or materially lessened the value of [Wintergreen's] remaining lands." (R. 17 (Claim 4, ffi[3841) at Tf 39). Wintergreen also alleged "UDOT's conduct in substantial degree abridged or
destroyed [Wintergreen's] right to use and enjoyment of [Wintergreen's] remaining lands."
(EL 16-17 (Claim 5, fl[42-45) at 143).
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(4) "Damaging"
A "damaging" under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution as presently
construed requires "some physical disturbance of a right, either public or private, which the
owner enjoys in connection with his property and which gives it additional value, and which
causes him to sustain a special damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained
by the public generally... with a perceptible effect on the present market value." Colman v.
Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d at 626 (turbulence from state pumping water from Great
Salt Lake destroying underwater brine canals). Such interference must be "physical and
permanent, continuous, or recurring." Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City,
803 P.2d at 1244 (diminution of value and cost of repairs to mall from city's temporary
diversion of city creek during construction of culvert for creek).
Wintergreen properly alleged such elements of a "damaging" claim as follows:
% 47. UDOT through the physical conduct of failure to open 2200 North westbound
from SR-36, rendering of 2200 North as a right-in, right-out street in relation to SR36, and blocking of 2000 North from traffic in relation to SR-36, destroyed Plaintiffs
right to develop its remaining lands into the North Town Shopping Center as an
integrated economic unit, which gave Plaintiffs remaining lands additional value.
f 48. UDOT's conduct caused Plaintiff special damage in excess of that sustained by
the public generally because Plaintiffs remaining East Side land was rendered isolated
from Plaintiffs remaining West Side land, as well as from the areas surrounding
Plaintiffs remaining East Side land, because Plaintiff no longer has access to or from
SR-36 on 2000 North, and has no access to southbound SR-36 from 2200 North, but
instead must travel a circuitous route eastward on 2000 North or 2200 North, then
north on 400 East, then finally south on SR-36.
^ 49. Such damage sustained by Plaintiff is a definite physical injury cognizable to the
senses because Plaintiffs remaining lands are isolated from each other as well as from
SR-36 to a substantial degree.
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^[ 50. Such damage sustained by Plaintiff has a perceptible effect on the present
market value of Plaintiffs remaining lands because all of such lands have been
isolated from each other, Plaintiff has been prevented from developing its lands into
the North Town Shopping Center as an integrated economic unit, and Plaintiffs
remaining lands have been substantially diminished in value.
(R. 15-16 (Claim 6,1J1J46-52) atffif47-50).
2. Wintergreen's Complaint Properly Alleges Federal Constitutional
Claims
a. The Federal Just Compensation Clause is Self-Executing Against
the State
The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution protects "private property" from governmental "taking" for "public use" without
payment of just compensation. U.S. CONST, amend. V. The Fifth Amendment's Just
Compensation Clause is self-executing and applies to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, Sec. 1; Jacobs v United States,
290 U.S. 13 (1933); Chicago. B. & O. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,241,17 S. Ct 581,586
(1897).
The United States Supreme Court on innumerable occasions has applied the federal
Just Compensation Clause against States directly. See, e.g. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
544 U.S. 528, 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005)(suit challenging Hawaii state statute); Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606,617 (2001)(MThe Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, [is]
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment...."); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis. 480 U.S. 470, 481 n.10 (1987)(restriction of the federal Just
Compensation Clause "is applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."); Webb's
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Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,160 (1980)(federal Just Compensation
Clause "prohibition, of course, applies against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment"). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has applied the Just Compensation
Clause against States without even bothering to mention the principle. See, e.g.. Brown v.
Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
This court also has recently acknowledged that the federal Just Compensation Clause
provides a direct action against the State of Utah. In Smith v. Price Development Company.
2005 UT 87, 125 P.3d 945 this court held that the State of Utah could not enforce a statute
that would have allowed the State to seize one-half of punitive damages awards in suits
between private parties. The State was joined as a party defendant in the trial court, which
held that the statute "effected an unconstitutional taking...in violation of article I, section 22
of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution." Id. f 1 (emphasis added). On appeal, this court defined the issue as "whether
the Smiths' interest, if any, was 'taken' within the meaning of article I, section 22 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution." Id. 1fl3 (emphasis added). The Court affirmed the judgment against the State.
In addition to a substantive right under the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation
Clause, Wintergreen also has an independent substantive right to injunctive relief against
UDOT under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young. Verizon Maryland. Inc. v. Public Service
Com'n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635,645 (2002)("In determining whether the doctrine of Ex
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Parte Young [applies,] a court need only conduct a 'straightforward inquiry into whether [the]
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized
as prospective."' (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho. 521 U.S. 261,296 (1997));
Ex Parte Young. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Here, Wintergreen sought injunctive relief, inter alia,
"mandating Defendant UDOT to open 2200 North westbound from SR-36; to render 2200
North as a four-way intersection at SR-36, with appropriate traffic signal devices; [and] to
remove the obstruction of 200 North from traffic to and from SR-36 northbound and
southbound...." (R. 14 (Prayer for Relief) at f (d)(i))
b. Wintergreen Properly Alleged Each Element of Federal Inverse
Condemnation Claims
Wintergreen properly alleged three "taking" claims (Claims 1,2 and 3) under the Just
Compensation Clause of the Constitution of the United States.
(1) "Partial Taking" of All Wintergreen's Remaining Land
Wintergreen's complaint properly alleges under the federal constitution that
Wintergreen has suffered a "partial taking" of its remaining land in that "Defendant UDOT
through the UDOT SR-36 Project imposed substantial economic harm on Plaintiffs
remaining lands, Plaintiff has demanded compensation for such harm, and UDOT refuses to
pay such compensation" and that "[s]uch conduct by UDOT constitutes a partial taking of
Plaintiffs property." (R. 19-20 (Claim 1, If 19-24) atffl20,22 ); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.
533 U.S. 606, 617-18, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2457-58 (2001)("Where [governmental
conduct]...places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial
use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including
17

the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
government action.").
(2) Total "Categorical Taking" of Reduction in Value of
Wintergreen's Remaining Land
Wintergreen's complaint also properly alleges under the federal constitution that
Wintergreen has suffered a total "categorical taking" as a result of UDOT's conduct because
"Defendant UDOT through the UDOT SR-36 Project imposed substantial economic harm
on Plaintiffs remaining lands, Plaintiff has demanded compensation for such harm, and
UDOT refuses to pay such compensation" and "[s]uch conduct by UDOT constitutes a
categorical total taking of the reduction in value of Plaintiff s remaining lands resulting from
UDOT's conduct." (R. 18-19 (Claim 2,ffif25-30)atffif26, 28); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.
533 U.S. 606,630-31,121 S. Ct. 2448,2464-65 (2001)(total categorical taking of narrowlydefined property interest).
(3) "Unconstitutional Condition" Taking
Wintergreen's complaint also properly alleges under the federal constitution that
Wintergreen has suffered a taking through imposition of an unconstitutional condition
because "UDOT through the UDOT SR-36 Project" engaged in "excessive condemnation"
by attempting to force Wintergreen to give up the value of Wintergreen's land as an
integrated economic unit in exchange for the inadequate compensation UDOT offered
Wintergreen in the three direct condemnation lawsuits. (R. 17-18 (Claim 3,ffi[31-37)at ffl
32,35); Linde v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.. 544 U.S. 528,125 S. Ct. 2074,2087 (2005)(rejecting
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"not substantially advance" test for takings, but retaining doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions).
II. Wintergreen f s State Constitutional Inverse Condemnation Claims are not Precluded
by UDOT's Statutory Direct Condemnation Lawsuits
The trial court dismissed Wintergreen's Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Claims for Relief for
inverse condemnation under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution on the ground that
UDOT's initiation of direct condemnation proceedings under state statute against parts of
Wintergreen's land precluded Wintergreen's state constitutional inverse condemnation claims
with respect to all of Wintergreen's land detrimentally affected by UDOT's conduct. (R. 16977 at 172)
The trial court thereby erroneously elevated state legislation over state constitutional
rights.
A. The Three Direct Condemnation Lawsuits Brought by UDOT Will Not
Provide Wintergreen With Constitutionally Adequate Recovery
Article I, Section 22 provides a "textual constitutional right" to compensation.
Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder County Sch. Dist. 2000 UT 87, \ 20, 16 P.3d 533
(Article I, Section 22 provides a "textual constitutional right to damages for one who suffers
[that] constitutional tort.").
Thus, this court need not determine whether it would formulate a damages remedy
under its common law authority. Id. at 123 (damages remedy under this court's common law
authority is provided only in "appropriate circumstances"). Instead, the court need only
consider whether the three direct condemnation lawsuits brought by UDOT will provide
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Wintergreen with constitutionally adequate recovery.
1. Three Direct Condemnation Lawsuits Brought by UDOT Artificially
Fragment Wintergreen's Property
The three direct condemnation lawsuits brought by UDOT artificially fragment
Wintergreen's 121 acres of land into three isolated segments. Such fragmentation results in
denying constitutionally required "just compensation" to Wintergreen.
Case 524 isolates a 16.666-acre parcel of land owned by Wintergreen on the east side
of SR-36 as a separate segment and appropriates 2.183 acres in fee, imposes a permanent
easement on .111 acre, and imposes three temporary easements on .022 acres. Case 525
isolates four adjacent parcels of land owned by Wintergreen on the West side of SR36
totaling approximately 104.175 acres as a separate segment and appropriates 2.147 acres in
fee. Case 459 isolates 2400 North as a separate segment and appropriates .275 acres of
Wintergreen's land for road surface. (R. 21-22ffif8-10)
2. Impact of Fragmentation of Wintergreen's Land by Three Direct
Condemnation Lawsuits Brought by UDOT
a. Recovery Under Utah Code Section 78-34-10(1) for Land
Actually Appropriated
Utah Code Section 78-34-10 defines the recovery statutorily available to a landowner
in direct condemnation proceedings. Subsection (1) provides for recovery of the value of the
land actually appropriated. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-10(1). Under Subsection (1),
Wintergreen is entitled to compensation for the segments of land actually appropriated by
UDOT.
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b. Recovery Under Utah Code Section 78-34-10(2) for Harm to
Land Remaining After an Actual Appropriation: Statutory
"Severance Damages11
Subsection (2) of Utah Code Section 78-34-10 provides:
[I]f the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel the
damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of
its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff... .
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-34- 10(2)(emphases added). Under Subsection (2), Wintergreen is

also entitled to compensation in the fomi of "severance" damages, consisting of Type-(i)
damages to remaining land resulting from the fact of detachment of a portion of land from
a "larger parcel" and Type-(ii) damages to remaining land resulting from construction on
land actually appropriated. State v. Harvey Real Estate. 2002 UT 107,ffi[10-11, 57 P.3d
1088.
With respect to Type-(i) severance damages, (those resulting from the fact of
detachment of a portion of land from a "larger parcel"), the amount of damages obtained is
substantially affected by the definition of the "larger parcel" from which the land actually
appropriated is detached. The difference is particularly dramatic in this case, since the 121acre assembled landholding has value because it is large enough to comprise a future
shopping mall. UDOT artificially fragmented the relevant "larger parcel" into three isolated
direct condemnation lawsuits. Not surprisingly, and almost inevitably, UDOT offered no
severance damages in any of those three direct condemnations. ((R. 20 ^[20; R. 154)
With respect to Type-(ii) severance damages, (those resulting from construction on
land actually appropriated), Wintergreen's recovery is limited to impacts to its remaining
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land resulting from construction of improvements by UDOT on the appropriated land. State
v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT 107, ^10, 57 P.3d 1088 ("Section 78-34-10 gives a
landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused by the construction of the
improvement made on the severed property. It does not give the landowner the right to
present evidence of damages caused by other facets of the construction project.").
Here, UDOT's physical conduct occurred primarily on land which UDOT already
owned or controlled. Thus, UDOT permanently blocked off a street serving Wintergreenfs
land; transformed another street into a right-in, right-out-only turnoff; and erected barriers
to prevent traffic from crossing from Wintergreen's land on one side of SR-36 to
Wintergreenfs land on the other side of SR-36. (R. 20-21ffif14,15,17,18) Thus, similarly,
UDOT offered no severance damages in any of the three direct condemnations for such harm
either. (R. 20 1f20; R. 154)
c. Recovery Under Utah Code Section 78-34-10(3) for Land "no
part" of Which is Actually Appropriated
Subsection (3) Utah Code Section 78-34-10, provides:
[I]f the property, though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by the construction
of the proposed improvement, the amount of such damages....
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-34-10(3). There are five independent reasons why Subsection (3) will

not result in constitutionally adequate recovery here. First, the subsection is not applicable
in this case because it allows recovery for damage to land only "if...no part thereof is taken".
State v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P.2d 113 (1948)("If there is no taking of part of the
property, [then recovery is available for] a damaging as contemplated by paragraph (3)... .ff).
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UDOT unquestionably has "taken" part of Wintergreen's 121 acres in the three direct
condemnation lawsuits. By the plain meaning of its express terms the statutory claim for
damages provided by Subsection (3) is precluded by the statutory direct condemnation
lawsuits brought by UDOT. Utah Public Employees Assfn v. State. 2006 UT 9, If 72, 131
P.3d 208 (plain meaning of statute controls).
Second, Subsection (3) by its terms applies only 1o damage caused "by the
construction of the proposed improvement... ." In this case, part of Wintergreenfs harm
resulted from UDOT'sfragmentingof Wintergreen's "remaining land" through UDOT's filing
of three separate direct condemnation lawsuits, each isolating a small segment of UDOT's
land. Thus, instead of a unitary, 116.511-acre remaining land "larger parcel," the three direct
condemnation lawsuits treated smaller bits of Wintergreen's land as the "larger parcel" in
each case. The result was that UDOT offered no severance damages at all. Such harm caused
by the fragmentation of Wintergreen's remaining land, however, is not recoverable under
Subsection (3) because it is not caused "by the construction of the proposed improvement."
Third, Subsection (3) has been construed narrowly by this court to apply only to
"physical" impact "cognizable to the senses" on the owner's property. See Colman v. Utah
State Land Board. 795 P.2d at 626 ("This Court has also defined... [Section 78-34-10(3) of]
the eminent domain statute" as limited to physical impact "cognizable to the senses")(quoting
Bd. ofEduc. of Logan City School Dist v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 314, 373 P.2d 697, 699
(1962)). Here, although Wintergreen suffered such physical impacts as well, a major impact
is on Wintergreen's legal rights to use, transfer and exclude others, resulting in devaluation
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of its remaining land. Such harm, as discussed in Part ILB.4.C below, is constitutionally
compensable under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
Fourth, Subsection (3) also has been construed narrowly by this court to include only
"unavoidable injuries arising out of the proper construction of a public use which directly
affect the market value of the abutting property... ." Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v.
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d at 1244. Thus, avoidable injury to Wintergreen's land caused by
UDOT's physical conduct of permanently blocking off a street serving Wintergreen's land;
transforming another street into a right-in, right-out-only turnoff; and erecting barriers to
prevent traffic from crossing from Wintergreen's land on one side of SR-36 to Wintergreen's
land on the other side of SR-36 would not be compensated under the statute. Farmers New
World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City. 803 P.2d at 1245 ("Avoidable injuries not directly
resulting from the construction or operation of a public improvement are not within the
statute's protection.").1 In contrast, such harm is compensable under Article I, Section 22.
Fifth, "[djamages arising out of carelessness or negligence or indifference in the
construction of a utility upon land taken for public use are not damages contemplated by the
statutes as recoverable under the principles of law pertaining to eminent domain
proceedings."Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d at 1245, quoting
Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d 405, 407 (1935)). Such
damages are "recoverable only in a negligence action." Id. at 1245-46. The Utah
1

. It is not entirely clear whether this court in Farmers New World was construing the
statute or Article I, Section 22. See Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803
P.2d at 1246 n.2 ("We acknowledge that the statute is inapplicable to this case and cite it only
as a reflection of current legislative views on public policy.").
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Governmental Immunity Act, however, immunizes the State from negligence liability in most
cases. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-301 (5)(exceptions to negligence liability). InColman,
though, this court held that the Legislature may not raise the shield of sovereign immunity
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act to immunize itself against inverse condemnation
claims under Article I, Section 22. Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d at 634-35 ("It
can hardly be maintained that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, alone among all doctrines,
is outside the limitations the people established [in the Utah Constitution]." And this court
also has made clear that lf[ijntent is not an element of [an inverse condemnation] action...."
Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d at 1246.
In summary, the net impact on Wintergreen of UDOT's filing of the three direct
condemnation lawsuits was twofold: (1) The fragmentation into three direct condemnation
lawsuits, with their concomitant isolated "larger parcel" definitions, prevented Wintergreen
from recovering for harm to the entirety of its remaining 116.511-acre tract; and (2) UDOTs
filing of the three direct condemnation lawsuits also prevented Wintergreen from recovering
for damage to its remaining land resulting from construction of improvements by UDOT
which permanently blocked off a street serving Wintergreen's land; transformed another
street into a right-in, right-out-only turnoff; and erected barriers to prevent traffic from
crossing from Wintergreen's land on one side of SR-36 to Wintergreenfs land on the other
side of SR-36.
Utah Code Section 78-34-10 therefore does not provide Wintergreen constitutionally
adequate recovery for the resulting harm. Such recovery under state law must be obtained by
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an inverse condemnation action under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
B. State Legislature May not Preclude State Constitutional Claims
1. The Role of This Court in Interpreting Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution
In Colman v. Utah State Land Bd„ 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990), this court
acknowledged that:
The history of [the cases holding that the Utah Legislature by statute could hold itself
immune from takings claims brought under Utah Constitution article I, section 22]
shows that for a time the Court's concentration on the doctrine of sovereign immunity
caused it to neglect this constitutional provision, which was designed to protect
individual rights. This elevation of legislation and common law principles over a clear
constitutional limitation strikes at the heart of constitutional government. The people
of Utah established the Utah Constitution as a limitation on the power of government.
It can hardly be maintained that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, alone among all
doctrines, is outside of the limitations the people established. In Dean v. Rampton,
556 P.2d 205 (Utah 1976), we stated:
The purpose of a constitution is to provide an orderly foundation for
government and to keep even the sovereign... within its bounds. Therefore, the
legislative power itself must be exercised within the framework of the
constitution. Accordingly, it has been so long established and universally
recognized, as to be hardly necessary to state, that if a statutory enactment
contravenes any provision of the constitution, the latter governs. 556 P.2d at
206-07 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)).
Id. at 634-35. See also Utah Public Employees Association v. State of Utah, 2006 UT 9 \ 18,
131 P.3d 208 ("It is important to note that in a republican form of government, and as
specified in our state constitution, the judicial power of the State is vested in this court.").
In Colman, this court held that the"framersof the Utah Constitution expected [Article
I, Section 22] to act as a real limit on the powers of the state...[and] certainly did not intend
to allow state government to override the constitutional guarantee with a legislative
enactment." Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d at 630. Thus, the court concluded
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that the Legislature could not, through the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, trump a
property owner's right to compensation under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
Id. at 634-35. More broadly, this court held that the Legislature could not use the concept of
sovereign immunity, embodied in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, to shield itself from
liability for takings or damagings of property under Article I, Section 22.2 In this case, this
court is similarly called upon to hold that the Legislature, through the state's direct
condemnation statutes, cannot trump a property owner's right to compensation under Article
I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
The Legislature "unquestionably has the right to take or damage private property when
necessary for public use." State v. District Court. 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502,505 (1937). The
Legislature also unquestionably has the right to adopt procedures for the exercise of that
power. Id. Direct condemnation statutes, including Utah Code Ann. Section 78-34-10,
embody such procedures. But the substantive content of the constitutional protections
afforded by Article I, Section 22, as confirmed by this court in Cohnan, is for this court to
determine. As in Colman. this court must not "neglect this constitutional provision." The trial
court's conclusion that the initiation of statutory direct condemnation proceedings precludes
2

. Other state courts have taken a similar perspective on their role as protectors of
individual property rights against state legislative action. See, e.g.. Buckeye Union Fire
Insurance Company v. Employers Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 383 Mich. 630, 178
N.W.2d 476 (1970)(state had acquired factory in tax foreclosure, and then let it deteriorate
and become a nuisance; Michigan Supreme Court held state constitution's Just Compensation
Clause covered the nuisance-type of "taking" involved and superseded state statute
immunizing state); Bums v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County. 218 Va. 625, 238
S.E.2d 823 (1977)(water discharged from county storm sewer caused $50,000 in damage to
plaintiffs, home; Virginia Supreme Court held state constitution's Just Compensation Clause
covered harm and superseded statutory governmental immunity).
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the assertion of a constitutional claim under Article I, Section 22 did just that.
2. Other States Allow Inverse Condemnation Claims Even if Direct
Condemnation Lawsuits Have Been Brought by the Government
Other state courts allow inverse condemnation claims-in the same lawsuit or in a
separate action-even if direct condemnation lawsuits have been brought by the government.3
Such uniform practice is not surprising, since considerations ofjudicial economy and
the need for consistent judgments on statutory and constitutional claims are thereby assured.
3- Wintergreen and UDOT Offered to Consolidate the Inverse
Condemnation Claims and the Direct Condemnation Actions, But the
Trial Court Refused to Do So
Wintergreen here requested that the four cases should be consolidated, or in the
alternative, that the three direct condemnation cases should be consolidated and
Wintergreenfs inverse condemnation claims should be deemed counterclaims in those
3

. See, e.g.. Brown v. State, 694 So.2d 1342, 1343-44(Ala. 1997)(inverse
condemnation action properly transferred action back to original county for consolidation
with state's direct condemnation action which was pending in original county and concerned
portions of same property; trying inverse condemnation and direct condemnation actions in
different counties could potentially result in inconsistent verdicts regarding same property
and consolidation of actions would promote judicial economy); Block v. Orlando-Orange
County Expressway Authority. 313 So.2d 75,76-77 (Fla. App. 1975)(constitutional inverse
condemnation claim is a compulsory counterclaim in the direct condemnation lawsuit
brought by the government); Flo-Rob. Inc. v. Colonial Pipeline Co.. 170 Ga. App. 650,652,
317 S.E.2d 885,887 (1984)(separate actions required; "Though the law generally favors the
prevention of a multiplicity of actions, it appears that condemnation law in Georgia rather
strictly limits the relevant evidence in condemnation cases and therefore separate suits for
different kinds of damages are not uncommon." Simon v. Dept. of Tramp., 245 Ga. [478],
479,265 S.E.2d 777.1: Kohn Enterprises. Inc. v. City of Overland Park. 221 Kan. 230,24-35,
559 P.2d 771,774-75 (1977)(landowner inverse condemnation claim for restriction of access
properly tried together with direct condemnation action for improvement ofportions of street
and for intersection improvements); City of Austin v. Casiraghi. 656 S.W.2d 576, 581-82
(1983)(inverse condemnation claim may be asserted separate from direct condemnation
lawsuit).
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consolidated cases. (R. 160-163). And in a letter to the trial court, UDOT conceded that
Wintergreen's state inverse condemnation claims could be consolidated:
"UDOT asks that the Article I, Section 22 claims either be dismissed as improper
assertion of a counterclaim under Rule 13 or order that all Article I, Section 22 claims
for just compensation be heard as part of the consolidated condemnation case(s)."
(R. 161)(emphasis added) The trial court ignored the suggestions and instead dismissed all
Wintergreen's inverse condemnation claims altogether. (R. 170)
4. Substantive Content of Constitutional Protection Under Article I,
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution
As set out in Part LB. 1. above, Wintergreen's complaint properly alleges both "taking"
and "damage" claims under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution as interpreted by
this court to date. And as demonstrated in Part II.A. above, Utah's statutory provisions for
compensating harm to property caused by the SR-36 project undertaken by UDOT are
inadequate to compensate Wintergreen for the resulting harm. The definitions of a "taking"
and "damaging" under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, however, are in need
of further refinement.
a. Importance of Distinguishing Between Governmental Conduct
and Impact on the Owner
A large part of the difficulty in takings jurisprudence arises from the failure to
adequately differentiate between government conduct, on one hand, and its impact on an
owner, on the other.4 The distinction is critical, since what the government intends, on one
4

. See, e.g.. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency. 535 U.S. 302,322 n.17,122 S.Ct. 1465,1478 n.17 (2002)(conflating governmental
conduct and the impact on the owner); see generally John Martinez & Karen Martinez, A
Prudential Theory for Providing a Federal Forum for Federal Takings Claims, 36 REAL
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hand, may not be what the property owner experiences, on the other.5 Careful differentiation
between those two sides of the equation is therefore critical for formulating a refined "taking"
and "damaging" jurisprudence under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
b. Two Types of "Takings" Under Article I, Section 22
(1) Direct Condemnation
In "Direct Condemnation" types of takings, the governmental conduct is the
purposeful exercise of the power of eminent domain and the impact on the owner is complete
expropriation. In that setting:
[It is] a settled principle of universal law, reaching back of all constitutional
provisions, that the right to compensation [is] an incident to the exercise of the power
of eminent domain; that the one [is] so inseparably connected with the other that they
may be said to exist, not as separate and distinct principles, but as parts of one and the
same principle; and that the legislature fcan no more take private property for public
use with just compensation than if this restraining principle were incorporated into,
and made part of, its State Constitution/
Chicago. B. & O. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,237-38,17 S. Ct. 581,585 (1897)(quoting
Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 NJ.L. 129, 145, 1839 WL 2671, * 13, 34 Am. Dec. 184, 2
Harrison 129 (N.J. 1839)).
In this case, there is no dispute that Wintergreen will be entitled to just compensation
for the lands directly appropriated by UDOT in the three direct condemnation lawsuits.

PROPERTY,PROBATE&TRUST J. 445,453 (Fall 200 l)(discussing critical distinction between

governmental conduct and the impact of such conduct on an owner).
5

. "Intent is not an element of [an inverse condemnation] action." Farmers New World
Life Insurance Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d at 1246; Proceedings and Debates of the
Constitutional Convention, 327 (1898)("Damage is not always-in fact is not often
contemplated or expected. It comes unlooked for as the consequence of an act which the
party performs.")(Samuel R. Thurman)(Addendum Exh. 2, p.327).
30

(2) Functional Equivalent of Direct Condemnation
The Functional Equivalent type of taking occurs when governmental conduct, other
than the purposeful exercise of the power of eminent domain, has an impact on the owner
that is indistinguishable from the direct condemnation setting, and therefore similarly entitles
the owner to just compensation.
Governmental conduct in this type of taking is defined in contrast to governmental
conduct in direct condemnations. Any governmental conduct other than the purposeful
exercise of the power of eminent domain suffices. Physical governmental conduct qualifies.6
Regulatory governmental conduct, such as land use regulation, qualifies.7 And flawed direct
condemnation conduct, as in this case, also qualifies.8
On the impact side, the Functional Equivalent type of taking entails the practical
ouster of a property owner's possession by the government.9 Examples include the
government's seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike by coal

6

. See, e.g.. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419.102 S.Ct
3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982)(permanent physical occupation).
7

. See generally 3 Sands, Libonati & Martinez, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, §§
16.53.10-16.53.50 (takings resulting from land use control).
8

. See 3 Sands, Libonati & Martinez, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, § 21:14 (de facto
takings); § 21:16 (precondemnation blight).
9

. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.. 544 U.S. 528, 537, 125 S. Ct 2074, 2081 (2005);
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003,1014,112 S.Ct. 2886,120 L.Ed.2d
798 (1992); Transportation Co. v. Chicago. 99 U.S. 635,642,25 L.Ed.336 (1879)("practical
ouster of [the owner's] possession").
31

miners,,() the government's occupation of a private warehouse leased by a private tenant1! and
the permanent flooding of private land resulting from the construction of a dam.12
In Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Rv. Co., 28 Utah 201,77 P. 849 (1904), however,
this court defined a "taking" under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution as:
... any substantial interference with private property which destroys or materially
lessens its value or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any
substantial degree abridged or destroyed... .
Id. at 211, 77 P. at 852. See also Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d at 626.
In accordance with this precedent, Wintergreen has alleged that UDOT's conduct in
fragmenting Wintergreen's lai id t! u: oi ighthetl iree direct conden u: lationlaw suits, and! JDOTs
physical conduct negatively affecting Wintergreen's land, are "takings1' under Stockdale.
Thus, Wintergreen alleged "UDOT's conduct substantially interfered with and destroyed or
materiall)- lessened the v alue of [Wintergreen's] remaining lands." (R 1 3 (Claim 4, ^ 3 8-41)
at ^ 39). Wintergreen aNo I'llh'j'cd "UDO I "s romlm/i in sul^l;mti;il degree jhndjjed nr
destroyed [Wintergreen's] right to use and enjoyment of [Wintergreen's] remaining lands."
(R. 16-17 (Claim 5,ffi[42-45)atf 43): However, as discussed below, these claims may more
proper!) I r \ unveil as' damaging11 claims under a reconstructed Utah takings jurisprudence.

10

. United States v. Pewee Coal Co.. 3411IS, 114,71 S.Ct 670,95 L.Ed. 809 (1951).

11

.United States v. General Motors Corp., 32 \ I) S 5V I i»S S.O ^ I, M Lhd

.

(1945).
12

. Pumpellyv.GreenBavCompany.80U.S. 166,13 Wall. 166,20L.Ed. 557(1871).
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c. "Damaging" Under Article I, Section 22
(1) Illinois Constitution
In 1870 Illinois became the first state to amend its constitution to include "or
damaged" in its Just Compensation Clause.13 The change was inserted because prior to that
date, a "taking" had been interpreted to include only (a) direct condemnations and (b) only
non-direct condemnations in which the governmental conduct caused an impact on the owner
that constituted an actual physical intrusion onto an owner's property.14 The problem arose
because the City of Chicago, in the course of improving its sewer and drainage system over
a number of years, had raised the level of streets, sometimes as high as eight feet, leaving
owners of adjacent stores and homes far below the level of the newly-elevated city streets.
In Rigney v. City of Chicago. 102 111. 64 (1881), the rental value of such an owner's
land had been reduced from $60 a month to $23, and the market value of the land had been
reduced by two-thirds. IdL at 69. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the "or damaged"
provision provided compensation in those circumstances. Focusing on the impact side of the
equation, the court clarified that the error in providing compensation only for physical
impacts originated from a mistaken view of the legal concept of property:
Property, in its appropriate sense, means that dominion or indefinite right of user and
disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things and subjects, and
generally to the exclusion of all others, and doubtless this is substantially the sense in
which it is used in the constitution; yet the term is often used to indicate the res or the

13

. Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in
Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 115 (1999).
14

. Goodman's Peppermill Restaurant v. State of Illinois. 51 111. Ct. CI. 18,1999 WL
33246456,4* (1999).
33

subject of the property, rather than the property itself, and it is evidently used in this
sense in some of the cases in connection with the expression of physical injury, while
at other times it is probably used in its more appropriate sense, as above mentioned.
The meaning, therefore, of the expression "physical injury," when used in connection
with the term property, would in any case necessarily depend upon whether the term
property was used in the one sense or the other. To illustrate: If the lot and buildings
of appellant are to be regarded as property, and not merely the subject of property, as
strictly speaking they are, then there has clearly been no physical injury to it; but if by
property is meant the right of user, enjoyment and disposition of the lot and buildings,
then it is evident there has been a direct physical interference with appellant's
property, and when considered from this aspect, it may appropriately be said the injury
to the property is direct and physical....
Id at 78. Thus, "property" for constitutional purposes includes all the sticks in the bundle of
rights: the rights i

possess, to transfer, and to exclude others. The "or damaged"

provision in the amended constitution, the court held, corrected a prior misperception:
Under the constitution of 1848 it was essential to a right of recovery, as we have
already seen, that there should be a direct physical injury to the corpus or subject of
the property, such as overflowing it, casting sparks or cinders upon it, and the like; but
under the present constitution it is sufficient if there is a direct physical obstruction
or injury to the right of user or enjoyment by which the owner sustains some special
pecuniary damage in excess of that sustained by the public generally, which, by the
common law, would, in the absence of any constitutional or statutory provisions, give
a right of action.
Id. at 78 (emphasis added). Accordingly, governmental conduct which affects the value of
intit! (Iiniinj'fi unpads MM Ilie Mplil'. ('» use or possess, to transfer, or to exclude others, is
covered. The court-clarified that no I all such unpads aiv compensable, and ilial some
reductions in value must be absorbed by the landowner as the cost of living in a civilized
society:
While it is clear that the present constitution was intended to afford redress in a
certain class of cases for which there was no remedy under the old constitution, yet
we think it equally clear that it was not intended to reach every possible injury that
might be occasioned by a public improvement. There are certain injuries which are
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necessarily incident to the ownership of property in towns or cities which directly
impair the value of private property, for which the law does not, and never has,
afforded any relief For instance, the building of a jail, police station, or the like, will
generally cause a direct depreciation in the value of neighboring property, yet that is
clearly a case of damnum absque injuria. So as to an obstruction in a public street,—if
it does not practically affect the use or enjoyment of neighboring property, and
thereby impair its value, no action will lie. In all cases, to warrant a recovery it must
appear there has been some direct physical disturbance of a right, either public or
private, which the plaintiff enjoys in connection with his property, and which gives
to it an additional value, and that by reason of such disturbance he has sustained a
special damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the public
generally.
Id. at 81 (emphases added). Given the court's prior discussion about the legal conception of
"property/' the court's reference to a "direct physical disturbance," undoubtedly refers to
physical15 governmental conduct, not to physical impact on the owner. Subsequent cases in
Utah discussed below, however, erroneously interpreted Rigney as limited to physical
impacts on the owner.
Finally, the Illinois court carefully delineated the boundary between compensable
impacts on value and noncompensable costs of living in a civilized society. Thus, only those
impacts on value which constitute "a special damage with respect to his property in excess
of that sustained by the public generally" were held compensable. IcL That formulation is
consistent with the foundational principle of modern Just Compensation law that individuals
should not be sacrificed to the community by having to bear public burdens that "in all
fairness and justice, should be bome by the public as a whole." Stockdale v. Rio Grande
15

. Modem Just Compensation jurisprudence, of course, has expanded protection
against governmental conduct which is nonphysical, such as land use regulation, as well as
against physical governmental conduct. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393,43
S.Ct 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922); see generally 3 Sands, Libonati & Martinez, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW, §§ 16.53.10—16.53.50 (takings resulting from land use control).
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Western Ry. Co., 28 Utah 201, 203, 77 P. 849, 852 (1904)("The tendency under our system
is too often to sacrifice the individual to the community."); Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
i

tah Constitution

The Framers of the Utah Constitution coii fronted the sarcu j M i - '1cm of elevated streets
and resulting uncompensated damage as had arisen in Illinois.16 The Framers therefore
included the words "or damaged" in Utah's Just Compensation Clause because they also were
concerned 11 ut ( 11 i-ri'd \ pn vl 111 > 11 mg "takings" without compensation would not protect owners
whose property was neither actually npproprmlcd in ;,i JINY! condemnation, noi subjected to
non-direct condemnation governmental conduct that resulted in physical intrusion impact on
the owner's property.
In twenty-Second Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Oregon
Short Line R. Co.. 36 Utah 238,103 P 2 43 (1909), 1 his < •< >m I h< 1 11 hi i;( IUrisefr<»iii i i railr< >a< I
did not amount to a "damaging" of adjacent buildings used for secular and religious purposes.
Unfortunately, subsequent Utah decisions construed the opinion in Twenty-Second Corp. of
1

. See Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 326-27 (1898)("or
damaged" provision is meant to extend to circumstances "where an elevated road was erected
upon a street and while it did not touch the property of the abutting owner, did not destroy
a brick, did not take a foot of his ground, it did affect his use and occupation of his premises
very disastrously.")(Charles S. Varian) (Addendum Exh. 2, pp. 326-27)
See also Proceedings andDebatesofthe Constitutional Convention, 328 (1898)(fT
am in favor of retaining the words for damaged.11 recollect [when] I believe it was State
street [in Salt Lake.City]—the grade had been established for some years, and the city came
in and established a different grade and built the street up some ten feet higher than property
abutting on it.... There is a spectacle where they could not get any damages for it
[W]e
f
1
should make them pay for whatever they take, and I believe the words or damaged should
remain in the Constitution.ff)(Mr. Pierce)(Addendum Exh. 2, p. 328)
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Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints to extend far beyond its holding and thereby
severely limited the scope of the "or damaging" provision. Thus, in Colman v. Utah State
Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990), this court limited "damagings" to "some physical
disturbance of a right, either public or private, which the owner enjoys in connection with
his property and which gives it additional value, and which causes him to sustain a special
damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the public generally... with
a perceptible effect on the present market value." Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795
P.2d at 626. Further, in Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241,
1244 (Utah 1990), this court announced that "damagings" under the state constitution require
an interference that is "physical and permanent, continuous, or recurring."
Limiting "damagings" in that manner is inconsistent with the constitutional history and
purpose of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, since the Framers of the Utah
Constitution intended to protect against non-direct condemnation governmental conduct that
did not result in a physical impact. This court's decision in Stockdale, albeit denominating
it as a standard for "takings," actually articulated a perfectly usable "or damaging" standard
that is consistent with the Framers1 intent:
... any substantial interference with private property which destroys or materially
lessens its value or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any
substantial degree abridged or destroyed....
Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Rv. Co., 28 Utah 201, 211, 77 P. 849, 852 (1904). That
standard more closely reflects an accurate interpretation of the Rigney decision as well.
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d. Jury u.

in

The Framers of the Utah Constitution fully intended that a jury would determine
whether the state has committed a compensable taking or damaging. See Proceedings and
Debates of the Constitutional Convention 327 (1898)("...the means of arriving at the estimate
are within the knowledge of men and can be adduced before a jury.")(Loiin Farr)(Addendum
Exh. 2, p.327). See also UTAH CONST, art. I, §10 (Trial by Jury); International Harvester
Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor, 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981 )(Utah Const, art. I, § 10 guarantees
right iojuiy in.il n legal issu

\ - « FTAH CODE ANN. §78 21-1 ("In actions for

the recovery of specific real or personal property, with or withoiit damages, c-

itloney

claimed as due upon contract or as damages for breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue
of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered.");
Richards v. Salt Lake-City. 4'J l H.ili ,'K, U\\ I <>K0| II« i111»III whether road debris on private lot
warrants compensation is a question for the jury).17
With instructions based upon the standards for "takings'1 and "damagingsf, set out
above, a jury can properly determine whether a taking or damaging has occurred.
i n . Wintergreen's Federal Constitutional Inverse Condemnation Claims are not
Precluded by UDOTs Direct Condemnation Lawsuits Under State Statute
The trial court dismissed Wintergreen's First, Second and Third Claims for Relief for
inverse condemnation under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
iJlfiiiiMI Slates (!onslilution on

initiation of direct condemnation

11

. See also Williams v. State ex rel. Dept of Transp.. 2000 OK CIV APP 19,135,
998 P.2d 1245 (jury detennination of amount of damages must be necessarily preceded by
jury detennination that inverse condemnation has occurred).
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proceedings under state statute against parts of Wintergreen's land precluded Wintergreen's
federal constitutional inverse condemnation claims with respect to all of Wintergreen's land
detrimentally affected by UDOT's conduct. (R. 169-77 at 172)
The trial court thereby erroneously elevated state legislation over federal constitutional
rights.
A. Federal Inverse Condemnation Claims in Federal Courts Against the Federal
Government are Allowed even if Direct Condemnation Lawsuits Have Been
Initiated by the Federal Government
If the federal government brings a direct condemnation lawsuit in a federal district
court, then a property owner may recover in the direct condemnation proceeding: (a) the
value of the land appropriated, (b) damages to the remaining land caused by detachment of
the appropriated land, and (c) damages to the remaining land caused by construction of
improvements by the government on the appropriated land. U.S. v. Grizzard. 219 U.S. 180,
183,31 S. Ct. 162, 163 (1911); cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-10 (same principles).
If the owner claims damage to the remaining land other than from these three causes,
and if such inverse condemnation claim is for $10,000 or less, it may be asserted as a
counterclaim in the federal district court under the Little Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2);
U.S. v. 3.218.9 Acres of Land. 619 F.2d 288, 292 (3rd Cir. 1980). If such inverse
condemnation claim exceeds $10,000, it may still be asserted, but it must be brought in a
separate action in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1491.
Therefore, "though he may have to appear in two proceedings to obtain the totality of that
compensation... [t]he 5th Amendment, while it guarantees that compensation be just, does not
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guarantee that it be meted out in a way more convenient to the landowner than to the
sovereign." U.S. v. 101.88 Acres of Land. 616 F.2d 762, 772 (5th Cir. 1980).
B Federal Inverse Condemnation Claims in Stati* Courts Against State
Governments are Allowed Even if Direct Condemnation Lawsuits Have Been
Initiated by the State Government under State Legislation
As set out in Part LB.2 above, Wintergreen's complaint proj ^ alleges a "partial
taking/1 a total "categorical taking" and an "unconstitutional condition" taking under the
federal Just Compensation Clause. A state statutory direct condemnation proceeding does not
override federal constitutionr:

ts.

The principle of federal supremacy prohibits state Legislatures from overriding federal
constitutional rights through state legislation. U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2 ("This
Constitution...shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
lumiul thereby, .ins I IMP

""» Nu < 'niisliluhnii <i" I avis nf m\ Stall In (lit Contrary

notwithstanding.")
Thus, for example, in Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida. 457 U. S. 496,
102 S. Ct 2557,73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C.

federal courts. And in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 10i i - • •
(1988), the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 preempts state notice-of-claim statutes in
federal civil rights actions brought in state court.
'Himhu'h "IK "Ifuvn ninilniiiiiitioii siidik n UHi uiiin-f mniwle Wintergreen's
federal constitutional rights. C£ Com, of Mass. v. Bartlett. 266 F.Supp 390, amended i »ii
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other grounds 384 F.2d 819, certiorari denied 390 U.S. 1003,88S.Ct. 1245,20L.Ed.2d 103
(D. Mass. 1967)(state power of direct condemnation, like other powers of the state, is subject
to Supremacy Clause, and the state's exercise of its power must yield when it conflicts with
a paramount federal statute).
C. Federal Ripeness Doctrine Does not Apply
In Patterson v. American Fork City. 2003 UT 7, f 35,67 P.3d 466 this court held that
a federal Just Compensation Clause claim was not ripe for adjudication in a Utah state court
until the property owner had obtained a complete adjudication of a state inverse
condemnation claim. Subsequently, in San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and County of San
Francisco. 545 U.S. 323, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2506 (2005), the United States Supreme Court
held:
The requirement that aggrieved property owners must seek Compensation through the
procedures the State has provided for doing so,1 [Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172,194,105 S. Ct.
3108, 87 L.E.2d 126 (1985)] does not preclude state courts from hearing
simultaneously a plaintiffs request for compensation under state law and the claim
that, in the alternative, the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution."
Accordingly, Wintergreenfs inverse condemnation claims under the federal Just
Compensation Clause can be adjudicated by the trial court simultaneously with Wintergreenfs
inverse condemnation clause claims under the Utah Constitution on remand.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment dismissing Wintergreen's inverse condemnation complaint
should be reversed. Since Wintergreen's appeal thereby will have resulted in substantial
benefit to the piihl n as a result of the refinement in state inverse condemnation law brought
about by this appeal, Wintergreen should be awarded its costs on appeal UTAH RULES APP.
PROC.

34(b)(costs on appeal against the state of Utah); Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App 110,

Tf 14, 22 1* id 1249 (successful appellant entitled to costs on appeal).
DATED this 26th day of June, 2006.

TI^EZ
Plaintiff-Appellant Wintergreen
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit 1:

Map depicting Wintergreen's land. (R. 81)

Exhibit 2:

Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 315-16,
326-329 (1898)
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BILL OF RIGHTS.

might refuse to give an examination,
then
The CHAIRMAN The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentleman
fiom Weber as amended
Mr THURMAN "Unless waived by
the accused with the consent of the
State "
Mr WHITNEY. I t is proposed t o p u t
all t h a t between 4 'examination'' and
"and9"
Mr VARIAN
No, after "commitment "
Mr EVANS (Weber)
Let it go after
the w o i d "magistrate "
Mr. THURMAN
You will have t o
add t o the word, " m a g i s t r a t e , " "unless
examination is waived by the accused
with the consent of the S t a t e . "
The CHAIRMAN. The article as proposed t o be amended would read as follows:
Oifen&es heretofore required t o be
prosecuted by an indictment shall be
prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate,
unless the examination be waived by
the accused with the consent of the
State.
Mr. VAN HORNE. What is the rest
of the amendment?
Mr. VARIAN. That is all.
Mr. BUYS. Mr. Chairman, it seems
to me that this would waive the commitment which I don't think we wish
to waive. It seems t o me it should be
after "information" or the words "unless
the examination be waived," as suggested by the gentleman from Utah.
Mr. WELLS. Mr. Chairman, I would
like to ask s6meof these legal gentlemen
a question, whether or not, if an examination is waived, is it not the same as
an examination?
Why these words
are necessary at all?
Mr. EVANS (Weber). This, as it n o w
stands, requires an examination. If
there wasn't an examination it would
be error t o take proceedings against the
accused by information.
The amendment w a s agreed t o .
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Mr EICHNOR
Mr Chairman, I
move t o amend section 13 by striking
mg out, after the w o i d "commitment"
and msert m lieu theieof, "the grand
jury shall consist of seven persons, of
w h o m five must concur on indictment,
b u t no grand jury shall be d r a w n and
examined unless in the opinion of t h e
judge of the distuct, public interest
demands one "
The amendment w a s agreed t o .
On motion of Mr. Evans, oi Weber,
the committee arose.
The committee then arose and reported t o the Convention as follows:
Your committee of the whole, after
examining and carefully considering the
preamble and bill of rights, report progress.
The Convention then a t 4:43 p. m,
adjourned.

TWENTY-SECOND DAY
MONDAY, March 25,1895.
The Convention was called t o order
at 2 p. m. by President Smith.
The roll was called and the following
named members were found in attendance:
Adams
Kimball, Weber
Allen
Larsen, C. P.
Anderson
Lemiuon
Barnes
Lewis
Bowdle
Low, Wm
Boyer
Low, Peter
Brandley
Low, Cache
Button
Lund
Buys
Maeser
Call
Mackintosh
Cannon
Maloney
Chidester
Maughan
Christianson
M cFarland
Clark
Morris
Coray
Moritz
Creer
Murdock, Beaver
Cunningham
Murdock, Summit
Gushing
Nebeker
Driver
Patre
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strikmg out "2 o'clock p m " on third
Eichnor
Partridge
line thereof, and inserting "10 o'clock
Emery
Peters
a. m."
VARIAN,
Engberg
Peterson, Grand
Acting Chairman.
Evans, Weber
Peterson, Sanpete
Mr. THURMAN
Mr President, I
Evans, Utah
Preston
move t h a t the rules be suspended and
Farr
Raleigh
t h a t the standing rule be amended in
FrancisEichards
accordance with the report.
Gibbs
Ricks
Mr. STREVELL. I move t o amend
Goodwin
Robertson
by making it 10:30 instead of 10.
Green
Robinson, Kane
The amendment w a s rejected.
Hammond
Robison, Wayne
The motion was agreed to.
Hart
Snow
The committee on ordinances and
Haynes
Squires
federal relations reported as follows:
Halliday
Stover
MR. PRESIDENT:
Heybourne
Strevell
Your committee on ordinances and
Howard
Symons
federal relations respectfully submit for
Hughes
Thurman
your consideration their joint report of
the accompanying draft of an ordinance
Hyde
Van H o m e
on compact, and recommend its adopIvins
Varian
tion. We also report back the following
James
War rum
propositions referred t o us:
File No. 118, by Mr. Maloney, of
Johnson
Wells
Weber.
Jolley
Whitney
File No. 153, by Mi Raleigh, of Salt
Keith
Williams
Lake.
With recommendation t h a t the l a t t e r
Kearns
Mr. President.
be referred t o the committee on schedule,
Kimball, Salt L a k e
future amendments and miscellaneous,
HEYBOURNE,
P r a y e r w a s offered by Rev. S. J.
Chairman
committee
on ordinance.
Adams, B a p t i s t district missionary for
PAGE,
Utah.
Chairman committee on federal
relations.
The journal oi the twentieth day's
session w a s read and approved.
The PRESIDENT. Under t h e rule it
Mr. Bo.ver presented a petition, signed goes t o the printers and will be put on
by Frank C. Leonard and t w e n t y others the calendar of the committee of the
of the Christian Endeavor Society, of whole.
Springville, U t a h County, for prohibiMotions and resolutions.
tion (file No. 156).
Mr. CH1DESTER. Mr. President, I
Referred t o committee on schedule and desire t o make a motion, and as a preffuture amendments and miscellaneous. ace t o this motion, I wish t o say t h a t
Mr. Morris presented a petition from the object of the motion is t o secure a
Edwin Dalton and 102 others, citizens speedy action upon the election bill. By
of P a r o w a n , asking t h a t the question a speedy action, I mean t h a t i t may n o t
of prohibition be submitted t o the peo- be delayed by the act of the minority,
ple (file No. 157).
w h o have informed the Convention t h a t
Referred t o committee on schedule and they wished t o make a report the other
future amendments a n d misceUaneous. day. I believe t h a t it is the object of
The committee on rules reported as some who do n o t favor this bill t o delay
follows:
i t and for t h a t reason the minority have
n
o t made any report. Of course, I m a y
MR. PRESIDENT:
The committee on rules, t o which w a s be mistaken on this, b u t t h e circumreferred resolution (not numbered) re- stances go t o prove t o me t h a t
lating t o morning sessions, herewith this is the case. Therefore, I move
report the same, w i t h the recommenda-

326

BILL OF RIGHTS.

had no such law before. We have had
nothing declaring this inequality, b u t
they have been equal just the same.
But there may a contingency arise in
this country when this power, or r a t h e r
this limitation upon the power of the
state government, will be exceedingly
dangerous. I think t h a t it ought t o be
wiped out and left entirely to the Legislature. F o r t h a t reason I am in favor of
the motion t o strike out.
Mr. WELLS. Mr. Chairman, I desire
t o state—the gentleman has said t h a t
this is the same proposition t h a t is in
the s t a t e of Wyoming. I will say t h a t
it is also in North D a k o t a , Arkansas,
Nebraska, South D a k o t a , Wisconsin—
as many as t h a t and I d o n ' t k n o w h o w
m a n y others.
Mr. ANDERSON.
Mr. Chairman, I
would be in favor of the motion for
this reason, t h a t there m a y come a
time when the safety and defense of our
government might require t h a t there
should be a distinction between aliens
and citizens, in regard t o holding property, and I think t h a t it can be safely
left t o the Legislature.
The CHAIRMAN.
Gentlemen, t h e
motion of Mr. Varian, of Salt Lake, w a s
t o strike o u t section 21. Mr. Wells
moves t o amend by striking o u t t h e
w o r d "resident" in line 2.
Mr. THURMAN.
Mr. Chairman, I
raise a point of order on t h a t ; t h a t is
n o t germane.
The CHAIRMAN. If the point of
order is raised, I shall have t o sustain
it.
The question w a s t a k e n on t h e m o t i o n
of Mr. Varian, and on division there
were: ayes, 49, noes, 43.
Section 21 w a s stricken out.
Section 22 w a s read as follows:
Section 22. Neither slavery n o r involu n t a r y servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the p a r t y shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist in
this State.
Mr, WHITNEY.
_
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t h a t the word "whereof" be stricken
out and the words, "of which" be substituted.
^
Mr. EICHNOR.
I think t h a t is t h |
language of the Constitution of t h i
United States.
,'|
Mr. WELLS. Exactly.
:-j
Mr. EICHNOR. I believe in adherin!
t o the Constitution of the United Stated
when we copy it.
j |
Mr. WHITNEY.
I t is a hundred
years old.
^|
The question being taken on till
motion of Mr. Whitney, the amend?
ment was rejected.
^1
Section 23 was read as follows:
.ill
Section 23. Private property shall
n o t be taken or damaged for public usi
w i t h o u t just compensation.
|j|
Mr. THURMAN.
Mr. Chairman, |
move an amendment by adding th&
w o r d s "first m a d e / ' so t h a t his corral
pensation shall be made before the prop!
erty is taken. T h a t is in accord with;
m o s t of the constitutions.
Mr. ROBERTS. Does t h a t mean
fore the damage is done?
r||j
Mr. THURMAN. No; I move t o s t r i | |
o u t the words "or d a m a g e d . "
^|J
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. Chairman, I cM
for a division of that—there are tw&
"•'.41$

motions.
-:^§
The CHAIRMAN. The chair will; J j j
vide the motion so t h a t the question,®]||
striking out "or damaged'' will first;®!
,J
$M
voted upon. .
Mr. THURMAN.
Mr Chairman,|g|
would like to suggest to t h e gentleman!
from Salt Lake, Mi-. Varian, t h a t xrt^i
purpose in offering this amendment #§]
t o provide for a compensation heiiig|
m a d e before the property is taken. U|||
t h e words "or d a m a g e d " are put^&|
there t h a t cannot be very well d e t $ l
mined. There ought t o be a
section covering the damage of tlft
property.
-tj
Mr. VARIAN; Mr. Chairman, IM
in accord with the motion of the
t l e m a n t o require the compensation ti|j
-.«^,-^,-.

4-.-
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to strike out "or damaged" is a very
material matter. I have taken pains
to look at.it a little to-day in the late
works on eminent domain, and I find
it is put in.other constitutions or statutes to meet the entire case. In some
states some courts have held t h a t damage t o property of a consequential kind
was not necessarily within the meaning
of the article of the constitution.
For
instance, I believe in Pennsylvania—I
may have confounded the state—the
question arose where an elevated road
was erected upon a street and while it
did not touch the property of the abutting owner, did not destroy a brick, did
not take a foot of his ground, it did affect his use and occupation of his premises very disastrously.. I t affected the
convenience of the inhabitants of a
house, and in this particular case, following later, it w a s held t h a t there, w a s
no remedy. There w a s not the t a k i n g
of the property. Now, the courts of
New York went off in another direction
and it is finally settled in t h a t case t h a t
such injury as t h a t could be compensated under the law of eminent domain.
To make it perfectly clear this w o r d has
been p u t in laws and constitutions, and
the text-writers say t h a t it is an equivalent for a n y kind of Injury of t h a t
land.
Mr. THUKMAN.
Mr. Chairman, I
agree t h a t the compensation ought to
to be made, b u t the trouble would be t o
make it first in t h e case of a consequential damage.
Mr. FARE. I do n o t see why. Take
a case like t h a t . * I t could be estimated.
There could be no subsequent change;
there is the railroad; there is the house;
there are the windows; there, is the
deprivation of light and air; there are
all the necessary inconveniences of noise
and soot and cinders, and disturbing
the peace and rest of the family.
That
fian be compensated for just as well in
the beginning as it can after the lapse
of ten years, because the means of ar-
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knowleclg^ of men and can be adduced
before a jury. I do n o t care how the
gentleman does it. I do not wish to be
technical a b o u t it; I would like t o see
those words, "or damaged," kept in
some way.
I hope those words, "or damaged,"
will remain in t h a t section. I do n o t
wish to argue the point, but I can see
in a great many instances where it
would be very important. F o r instance,
on a sidewalk, a person owning land;
they dig down a bank t e n o r fifteen feet,
and damage t h a t lot t o a great extent.
I think the man should be remunerated
for the damage done t o his lot. I move
t h a t those words remain in t h a t section
if they possibly can remain there.
Mr. THUKMAN. Mr. Chairman, m y
objection t o the w o r d s " o r d a m a g e d "
is the utter impracticability of providing for compensation before the
damage is clone. Now, I will cite an
instance familar t o a g r e a t many. A
few years ago people in Salt Lake
County placed some boards in a dam
here a t the point of the mountain:
they had a right t o do t h a t if they did
n o t damage anybody and I don't suppose they t h o u g h t they would damage
anybody, a t the sam.e time they did it:
J>ut the result w a s t h a t a great many
people in U t a h County were damaged,
after the act which caused the damage.
Now, in a case of t h a t kind h o w would
compensation be made before the act
w a s done which caused the damage?
Damage is n o t always—in fact is n o t
often contemplated or expected. I t
comes unlooked for as the consequence
of an act which the p a r t y performs..
Consequently it seems t o me t h a t as t o
t a k i n g property by the law of eminent
domain they should have t h e right t o .
t a k e it when they p a y for it, if the necessity for t a k i n g it exists. As regards
damaging it, why, it ought t o be paid
for as soon as the damage can be ascer-'.
tained. I t seems t o me t h a t this is the
only w a v t h a t it can be done.
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understand the gentleman correctly,
from Utah County, he would be in
favor of striking out the words, "or
damaged."
Gentlemen, 1 hope this
amendment will prevail. Jm-t for the
very reason that the gentleman from
Weber County said it should be in the
Constitution. Take a city like Salt
Lake, where grading is required, or any
other city where grading is required,
and you will bankrupt those cities if
you place this in the Constitution.
Every man that owns property in the
street—the street will be graded and
one or t w o or three people will claim
damages and the result will be it will
bring the municipalities into court.
Mr. VARIAN. Would not the compensation benefit always allowed in a
case of that kind more than equalize
the damage?
Mr. EICHNOR. The law is unsettled
at present in regard to the grading of
streets whether they can secure damages; it would simply bankrupt Salt
Lake City, I tell you that, gentlemen, if y^)u place this in the Constitution.
Mr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman, I am
in favor of retaining the words "or
damaged." I recollect a spectacle a few
years ago of grading in Salt Lake City.
There was a certain street—I believe it
w a s State street—the grade had been
established for some years, and the city
came in and established a different grade
and built the street up some ten feet
higher than property abutting on it.
There is a spectacle where they could
not get any damages for it, and the
street as it was built absolutely destroyed the value of their property and
they could not get a cent for that. I
say that it ought to be fixed so t h a t
the city must adjust the g^ade for the
accommodation of people that o w n
property along a certain street and
t h a t is the reason that I am anxious
t h a t the words "or damaged" should be
left in. And in speaking to the re-
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read a line or two troni Lewis in his
work upon Eminent Domain:
"When the people of Illinois revised
their constitution in 1870, they introduced an important change into the
provision respecting the power of eminent domain. The provision reads as
follows: 'Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation.' Every other state
which has revised its constitution since
1870, except North Carolina, which
never had any provision on the subject,
has followed the excimple set by Illinois
by adding the word 'damaged' or its
equivalent to the provision in question.''
And the question not only refers to
street grades in cities, b u t refers to
grades of railway property. For instance, it is unfair that a railroad should
run right next to a man's front door or
almost next to his front door, and that
his property should be destroyed or
half the value taken a w a y without
making some compensation for that
property which is really not reached,
as no part of the property is taken;
that is, the part of the property that is
damaged; and I say I am in favor of
being liberal in eminent domain act, but
whenever we grant this liberty to corporations in any way—public or private
corporations, we should make them pay
for whatever they take, and I believe
the words "or damaged" should remain
in the Constitution.
Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I am
opposed to the motion to strike out the
words "or damaged." I believe, as has
been said already in this discussion,
that when the public use a man's property or make an improvement that virtually destroys the use of that property,
that they should pay for it as much as
if the property itself were taken. Of
course, as has been suggested by the
gentleman from Salt Lake, whatever
benefit results by reason of this improvement is setoff against the damage
that is caused, and in that way the
public gets absolute justice in relation
t o the matter, but to say that a public
corooration should be permitted by the
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raising* of a grade or by the lowering* of
a grade or by any other kind of improvement to injure private property
and because they don't actually enter
upon and take the property itself,
although they do destroy the use of
the property, t h a t they should be liable
for damage; I think it is unjust and
unfair and I am therefore opposed t o
this motion.
Mr. RALEIGH. Mr. Chairman, I propose a slight amendment, "Private
property shall n o t be taken for public
use or damage w i t h o u t just compensation first be made." Simply a reconstruction of the section, t h a t is all.
The CHAIRMAN.
The chair rules
t h a t t h a t would be a proper question
on revision and compilation.
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
will w i t h d r a w the motion t o amend as
far as " o r d a m a g e d " is concerned if it is
n o t objected t o .
Mr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman, I d o n ' t
think t h a t 'first m a d e " should be p u t
in there* If I recollect the s t a t u t e correctly now, whenever a corporation is
permitted t o enjoy the benefits of the
eminent domain act and desires t o take
property a t all, before they can do it
they have t o apply t o the court-, and it
is within the discretion of the court t o
fix a bond and require good sureties
before t h a t property is taken, and I
believe it should be left t o the Legislature as t o how it shall be taken. This
is simply a declaration of principles
t h a t it shall n o t be taken. The Legislature can require any corporation
either private or public, t o p u t up a
bond before they t a k e anybody's property or damage it, w i t h o u t a n y cons Ututional provision.
Mr. CREER. Mr. Chairman, I a m in
favor of t h e motion of the gentleman
from Utah, t h a t t h e amendment shall
be added t o the section for the reason
t h a t n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the gentleman
from Salt Lake says compensation m a y
be secured, yet we k n o w of cases—there
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erty has been taken and the party dispossessed and t h a t the property be litigated for for considerable length of time
and the p a r t y kept out of possession,
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g there may be a bond
there, and a t the same time probably he
would have t o sue upon the bond
afterwards. I think it is a very strong
proposition a n y w a y t o give the public
a right t o dispossess a private person of
his property summarily and it seems t o
me he ought t o be compensated before
t h a t is done, because he may be put t o
a g r e a t inconvenience and loss of time.
He m a y have t o sue even upon the bond
after he should vindicate his rights in
the court. Therefore, I a m in favor
t h a t if t h a t should be required, he
should be first compensated before his
property is taken.
Mr. GOODWIN. Mr. Chairman, I do
n o t believe the committee can pass
such a n amendment. Emergencies m a y
arise when it would be simply impossible t o carry it out.
W h a t there
o u g h t t o be is a l a w (and t h a t belongs
t o the Legislature) t o compel fair treatment b o t h w a y s . I t is true t h a t railr o a d companies have had the right of
w a y , and they o w n and have owned
for t h i r t y years where they have gone
t h r o u g h . I t is just as true t h a t if you
t r y t o build a railroad t h r o u g h some
back street in P r o v o , or up t o some
mining camp, you would find yourself confronted w i t h the most ridiculous
p r o p e r t y values you ever heard of, a n d
every m a n in t h a t t o w n t h a t you would
get a s a n appraiser would raise t h e
price. I t is all right as it is; let t h e
Legislature fix i t sometime within a
year t h a t the property shall be paid for
and t h a t t h e p a r t y t a k i n g the property
shall give ample bonds. In this bill of
r i g h t s it is simply foolish t o p u t somet h i n g t h a t c a n n o t be executed, because
emergencies would arise in the mines,
in t h e cities, and in the fields, where
there are floods t h a t would make it impossible. Sometimes thp thino- \a +^ K~
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